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THE VALUE OF MYSTICISM.
Mysticism is the blight of science. Mysticism in
science is like a fog in clear daj'light. It makes the
steps of the wanderer unsafe and robs him of the
use of his most valuable sense—the sense of sight.
There is impenetrable darkness around him ; every-
thing is confused by insolvable problems. The whole
world appears to the benighted mystic as one great
and inscrutable enigma.
Mysticism in religion is widely different. It is
here where the value of mysticism must be sought
for. But religious mysticism does not claim that
truth is unknowable. It claims not only, as does
science, that truth can be known, it claims that truth
can he felt even before it is known. Truth is a strong
and wholesome power, unconquerable and omnipotent,
which is available not onlj'to the knowing but to those
also who grope in the dark, yet cherish the love of
truth in their hearts.
A scientist can scientifically enquire into the social
laws, and can after a life-time of long and laborious
study arrive at the truth, that what is injurious to the
swarm is not good for the bee. The ethical maxims :
thou shalt not steal, thou shall not kill, thou shalt
honor father and mother, the scientist will perceive,
are not cunningly invented by religious or political
leaders, they are the indispensable conditions under
which alone society can exist. Wherever they are not
heeded the whole community will go to the wall.
The individual that sins against these laws will injure
society, yet he will ruin himself at the same time.
The ethical truths are important truths, and it is
good to know them, to understand their full import-
ance. Yet even those who are unable to grasp them
in their minds; those who have not the scientific
knowledge to see how the moral law works destruction
to the trespasser and is a blessing to him who keeps
the law—even the unscientific, the poor in spirit, can
feel the truth ; they can trustingl)' accept it on faith
and can be sure that they are right. And truly, if
they do accept it, if they act accordingly, they are better
off than those scientists who have arrived at some
approximations that upon the whole it is perhaps after
all even for the single individual better to be honest,
than to be shrewd.
There are scientists and among them some of
great name and fame, who after a life-time of long
and laborious study did not arrive at the ethical
truths that the moral commands will preserve, and
that they do preserve, both the individual who keeps
them and the society to which that individual belongs.
There are naturalists who are very familiar with a
certain province of nature, especially with the brute
creation. They say, not the morally good will sur-
vive, but the strongest, the cunningest and the
shrewdest. The naturalists who say that, are most
learned professors; they are crammed with biological
data, and have made many zoological observations
;
they know facts of nature and have classified them as
natural laws—but Nature herself has not revealed her
divine face to them. They have not entered the holy
of holies in the temple of Creation, for they see parts
only, and do not perceive the whole ; they overlook
the quietly working tendencies of the whole. They
misinterpret the meaning of the partial truths that
happened to come under their observation.
Moral truth can be felt. Therefore let religious
mysticism gain hold of man so as to make him feel
the truth of the moral law even before he is able to
understand it.
The moral feeling is man's conscience. The moral
law and man's trust in the truth of the moral law
must not be planted into the reasoning faculty of man
only, it must be planted by example and instruction
into his heart long before the reasoning faculty of his
mind is developed. It must be made part of his in-
most soul long before he commences to study, to
learn, and to observe. It must be the basis of his
whole being, and the determining factor of his will.
If the moral law were merely superadded in later
life, if its presence in our minds rested upon abstract
conclusions only, upon logical arguments and syl-
logisms, how uncertain, how precarious would its in-
fluence be upon our lives. Rational insight must
come to strengthen the moral truth of our soul, but
its roots must be deeply buried in the core of our
heart. Science will come to explain what conscience
is, and why conscience is right in this or in that case,
science will also assist us to correct an erring con-
science, but if the basis of a man's character has not
been laid in early childhood, science will come too
late to benefit him through moralizing arguments.
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A conscience that is grounded upon ratiocination only,
is weak in comparison to a conscience that permeates
the whole being of a man, his emotions, his will, and
his understanding; his heart as well as his head.
Conscience must be, as we say in popular speech, our
"second nature"
—
yea, it must be our "first nature,"
so that in all situations of life, in tribulations, and in
temptations it will well up unconsciously with an
original and irresistible power, even before we can
reason about^the proper course of our actions.
The tempter approaches us always in the name of
science, but his arguments are not science, they are
pseudo-science. The tempter says: "Do not be fool-
ish, be wise. The criminals are convicted not for
their crimes but because they were fools ; they were
not shrewd enough to escape the consequences of their
deed. Be wise, be cunning enough, and thou wilt out-
wit all the world." There is no criminal who did not
think himself wise enough to escape the law, and if
he regrets at all, he will commonly regret not the deed
but one or the other of his mistakes which, as he sup-
poses, betrayed him. The criminal tries to remove
the vestiges of his deed ; yet the acts done to this
purpose become new and powerful witnesses against
him. They, chiefly, become the traitors that deliver
him to the judge.
Do not be deceived by the pseudo-wisdom of your
thoughts that lead you into temptation. They will
lead you into ruin, if you follow them. Do not be
deceived by the escape of evil-doers from their legal
punishment ; they carry a punishment within them
which is worse than the penitentiary. Neither be
deceived by the success of the unprincipled. Many of
those whom you suppose to be morally depraved, are
perhaps after all not so unscrupulous as you think.
They may have virtues and abilities, strength of will,
power of concentration, industry, intelligence, fore-
sight in business combinations, of which you think
little, but which meet the wants of their time and serve
the common good. Such men succeeded, perhaps, in
spite of those faults in their characters to which you
erroneously attributed their success. If they are really
unprincipled, and are successful in their enterprises,
do not judge of them before you have seen the fulfill-
ment of their destiny.
The royal psalmist of Israel, the shepherd boy, who
was a poet and at the same time a.hero, who bfecame
the king of his nation because he treated even his
enemies with justice, had during his career often seen
the unprincipled succeed, and so he sang
:
I have seen the wicked in great power and spreading himself lilte a green
bay tree.
Mark the perfect man and behold the upright, for the end of that man is,
peace.
It ma}' seem to you as if crooked means were better
than straightforward truth, as if small trickery and
well-calculated deceptions would gain the victory over
the simplicity of honest dealing. It may seem so to you
and it may seem so to your friends and advisers. It
is not ! Truth and justice are always stronger than the
strongest lies. And if you do not understand it, be-
lieve it and act accordingly.
I do not mean to say that if your cause is just, if
you are morally good and honest in your purpose, that
truth and justice will come down like gods from heaven
to assist you. O, no ! You must fight for truth and
you must stand up for justice with all your abilities and
foresight. What I mean to inculcate is not blind
confidence in the victory of truth and justice, as if they
intended actually to appear on earth to work for you,
instead of your working for them : I mean to say that^
under all circumstances, falsity, untruth, injustice, and
all immoral means, however cunningly they maybe de-
vised, are the most dangerous allies. Whoever as-
sociates with them will be sure to go to wreck and
ruin. The way to success, tO a final and solid success
is only that steep and thorny path on which virtue led
the Greek hero to Olympus. Because strait is the gate,
and narrow is the way which leadeth unto life and few
there be that find it.
But David continues
Yet he passed away, and, lo, he \
be found.
t
:
yea I sought him but In
IS LOGIC A DUALISTIC SCIENCE ?
BY PROF. JOHN DEWEY.
The Newer Logic may be roughly described as an
attempt to take account of the methods of thinking
employed by science, that is, of the methods the aim
of which is truth, and which deal with a material of
fact. It thus contrasts with the old scholastic logic,
which may be roughly described as an attempt to deal
with thinking in vacuo, that is with methods which
leave out (or abstract from) the material of fact, and
which have no aim except non contradiction of their
own premises—self-consistency. We ma}' call the latter
the Logic of argument, not of truth ; but the former is
the Logic of science, t. e., of actual knowledge.
Lotze, Sigwart, Wundt in Germany, Jevons, Brad-
ley, and Bosanquet in England are representative
names in this new logic. To it also Venn's Empirical
Logic is a most noteworthy recent contribution. While
written from a philosophical standpoint differing from
that of most of the foregoing names, it has an aim
common with theirs. It treats thinking as a process
having relation to truth. I confess, for my part, that
I could have wished Venn had chosen another philo-
sophical standpoint ; but without going into matters of
ultimate interpretation, Venn raises plenty of questions
well worth discussion on their own account as purely
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logical. Among these, as one of the most important,
I would place this : Does logic imply a duality, which
for logic is ultimate ? Venn answers in the affirmative,
calling attention however to the fact, that he means
only to assert that dualism is ultimate for logic ; the
metaphysical question is not raised.
Venn's own statement is as follows ; We must
take for granted a duality. On the one hand, outside
of us, there is the world of phenomena pursuing its
course ; and, on the other hand, within us, there is the
observing and thinking mind. Logic is concerned
with the judgments of the latter about the former.
"The thorough-going retention of this duality is one
of the leading characteristics of the whole treatment
adopted in this work " (Page 22). He then goes on
to show the evils resulting from a purely subjective or
a purely objective treatment. The latter " would con-
fine us to a bare statement of those laws which lie at
the basis of all inductive inference." while logic must
always bring in the attitude of the mind in estimating
or appreciating facts. The objective view would thus
exclude the whole field of inference. The purely sub-
jective treatment, on the other hand, would reduce
logic to the bare logic of self- consistency, without re-
lation to the true or to the false. So Venn concludes
(p. 26) that while there are "some sciences, like Psy-
chology, in which the primary reference is throughout
to the mental processes, there are others, like the or-
dinary physical sciences, in which the primary refer-
ence is throughout to the external phenomena. But
a science like logic, which has to do with the pro-
cesses of the human mind when judging about phe-
nomena, occupies necessarily an intermediate posi-
tion."
Now when I say that all that Mr. Venn says about
the evils of a purely subjective or purely objective
treatment seems to me wholly sound, and that I would
agree with him in saying logic deals with the process
of thought in judging about phenomena,—when I say
this, I may seem to have closed the door to further
discussion. But I would call attention to the fact that
these phrases may have two meanings. They may
mean that the mental process, the 'internal thought,'
and the objective phenomena, the 'external thing, ' are,
for logic at least, wholly independent and separate
data, and that then the logical process comes in as a
third thing and brings one to bear upon the other.
This is the sense in which Mr. Venn interprets the
dualism and is the sense in which I should reject it.
Or, again, the dualism may be interpreted as being in-
sitie, as it were, the logical process. That is to say,
we may hold that the "mental process of the mind in
judging about phenomena" is for logic, at least, ulti-
mate and decisive. The duality between the object
perceived and the thought conceived is not one with
which the logical process begins, but is the result of a
logical process ; that is, so far as logic has anything to
do with it.
We may illustrate the difference as follows : There
is the physical object, the sun moving in the heavens.
Here is my idea or concept of this object. Does logic
begin with this dualism and then go on to consider
how the idea may be brought into conformity with the
object ?
Mr. Venn would answer ' Yes.' To me it seems as
if the judgment of the mind were, for logic, the prim-
ary fact, and as if the distinction between the idea and
the fact were one which takes place within and on
account of the judgment—the logical process. The
question involves more than at first appears. Are
there, for logic at least, two worlds, of which one has
to be brought into conformity with the other, or is
there but one world, and that one logical through and
through ?
If the question concerned a world of objects wholly
unrelated to mind, it would be impossible to discuss
it without raising all manner of metaphysical difficul-
ties ; but, fortunately, Mr. Venn accepts the doctrine
of the ' relativity of knowledge.' He says (page 16),
"we postulate a world or aggregate of objects—not
out of relation to human faculties in general, which
would be absurd—but conditioned in relation to our
representative state of faculties." And on page 28 he
expressly says : ' ' We are in no wise concerned with
the question which for ages perplexed philosophers,
viz. , in what sense our ideas ' resemble ' or are ' copies
of actual external objects. All that we compare is
the impression at first hand and at second hand, the
presentation and the representation." And so on page
384 he says, that it is the general aim of logical pro-
cesses to secure a complete and accurate correspond-
ence between what we,think and conceive within us,
and what we observe and fee/ without us. The ques-
tion is then : How are perception and observation
logically related to thinking, to conception ? Does
logic take up its task when these are furnished to it
ready-made, thus having a dualistic basis, or do log-
ical processes enter equally into both perception and
conception, so that, from a certain standpoint, each
has a logical character ?
I shall attempt to sustain the latter position. In
holding that logic is not dualistic, because logical pro-
cesses enter into presentation as well as into scientific
methods, I may, in some sense, rely upon the author-
ity of Mr. Venn himself. One of the striking features
of his logic is the way in which he attacks our "habit
of regarding what we call 'objects ' as being in a way
marked out by nature, always and for all beings "
(page 6). This habit is so far from being justified
that as he says (page 5), "Select what object we
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please—the most apparently simple in itself, and the
most definitely parted off from others that we can dis-
cover— yet we shall find ourselves constrained to
admit that considerable mental process had been
passed through before that object could be recognized
as being an object, that is as possessing some degree
of unity, and as requiring to be distinguished from
other such unities." And Mr. Venn shows clearly and
decisively, to my mind, that in the most elementary
recognition of an object processes of analysis and
synthesis of very considerable complexity are involved.
In his forcible comparison, to expect a dog who could
not exercise quite a complex analysis and synthesis to
perceive a rainbow, would be hardly more reasonable
than to expect him to ' see' the progress of democracy
in the place where he lives—although the ultimate con-
stituent sensible events are as accessible to his obser-
vation as they are to ours (page 7 ; compare pages
143-144V
In a like manner, Mr. Venn attacks what he well
calls the ' alphabetic ' view of nature ; the idea that
objects come to us, so sharply discriminated and
separated that one may be represented by A, another
by B, and so on. " Generally speaking what we mark
out by the letters A, B, C, are more or less fictitious
entities, that is, they are manifold groups, held to-
gether in a mental synthesis with the cohesive assis-
tance of names The mere reference to individ-
uals, as the basis or starting point of our instruc-
tion presupposes that something has already been done
to recognize and constitute these A, B, C as individu-
als " (page 345).
Now it seems to me that as soon as we give up the
view that objects are presented to the mind already
distinguished from others and united into cohering
wholes, we are tacitly admitting that logical processes
enter into the recognition, or observation of facts.
When we go further and say that the individual object
becomes such to us only through a process of mental
synthesis and analysis, it seems to me that the admis-
sion is more than tacit—it is express. The only
ground on which the logical character of recognition
of objects could be denied, would be that mental analy-
sis and synthesis are not logical processes. I hardly
think Mr. Venn would take this position ; still less can
I see how he or any one else would uphold it. Mr.
Venn when treating more expressly of the nature of
analysis and synthesis, remarks (page 398) that "these
processes are best regarded as being merely subdivi-
sions of a much more far reaching process, viz., that
of framing hypotheses or suppositions. Set this faculty
to work ; employ it in separating wholes into their
parts and gathering up parts in order to constitute
new wholes, and we have what are known as analysis
and synthesis." From this view it would certainly
follow that our first perceptions of objects, being due
to analysis and synthesis, are, in a sense, tentative
hypotheses which we form in order to account for our
experiences. Of course from the standpoint of ordi-
nary experience it sounds absurd—and is absurd for
that matter—to say that ' the fire burns ' is a hypothesis.
But from the logical standpoint, it is far from being
absurd. Whence the whole chemical theory of com-
bustion, and what is the need of it, unless the first
judgment that ' fire burns ' is, after all, onl}' a tentative
and crude analytic-synthetic process, needing to be
carried farther, to be corrected, and, finally, trans-
formed into a hypothesis more nearly agreeing with
facts ? If this is not evident, substitute the judgment
'the sun moves' for the one 'the fire burns. ' The
objection most likely to be made to this doctrine that
presentation itself has a logical value and basis, is, I
imagine, that logical processes begin only when we
are aiming at truth—only when we have a definite end
in view which controls the process, and that there is
no such aim or end in ordinary observation. That we
are not consciously aiming at truth and that there is no
conscious criterion or standard which controls the
mental process in pre-scientific perception, is, of
course, admitted. And this unconscious functioning
of logical processes in perception seems to me to be
just its dijfereiiiia (logically, I would not say psycho-
logically or metaphysically) from scientific thinking.
Ordinary perception and scientific reflection have just
the same material, and follow, in the rough, the same
methods. There is hypothesis, induction, and deduc-
tion, inference, generalization, classification, analysis,
synthesis, whatever logical process you please to take,
in the perception of the sun as shining. But for the
very reason that these processes are unconsciously
followed they are uneconomical, imperfect, incorrect
;
they contain irrelevant material and leave out what is
really coherent. In a word, since the logical principles
are unconscious, the result is largely illogical, that is,
false. Compare such a statement as ' the sun shines '
with the statement which a modern astronomer would
make, when speaking from the standpoint of science,
about just the same experience. The latter judgment
would be carefully qualified ; it would be accurately
quantified ; the conditions, chemical and physical, of
the fact would be developed. The transformation
would be so great that an ordinary layman reading the
scientific proposition would probably not recognize
that it had any kinship to his judgment— ' the sun
shines.' But the real subject-matter would be the
same.
We do not have then two things first given—one,
the facts of observation, the other the mental concepts,
and then, thirdly, a logical process, starting from this
dualism, and attempting to make one side of it con-
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form to the other. Knowledge from the first, whether
in the form of ordinary observation or of scientific
thinking, is logical ; in ordinary observation, however,
the logical process is unconscious, dormant, and hence
goes easily and inevitably astray. In scientific think-
ing, the mind knows what it is about ; the logical
functions are consciously used as guides and as stand-
ards. But knowledge, experience, the material of the
known world are one and the same ail the way ; it is
one and the same world which offers itself in percep-
tion and in scientific treatment ; and the method of
dealing with it is one and the same—logical. The
only difference is in the degree of development of the
logical functions present in both.
We get the same result, if we consider from a
somewhat different point of view the relations of obser-
vation and inference. And here, again, Mr. Venn may
furnish the starting-point. For he himself admits that
we cannot find any material which is ' pure ' observa-
tion—that is observation without any element of in-
ference. "Really ultimate data can no more be
reached than can a first point or absolute limit in time
or space." "The starting point is a merely conven-
tional one, assumed for convenience. Everywhere,
wherever we look or find ourselves, we seem to be in
possession of data which are familiar to us and are jus-
tified by experience. This is our starting-point, and
not any really primitive data" (pages 115 and 116).
The ground for this position will occur to anyone
familiar with Mill's analysis of the proposition, " I saw
my brother at a certain hour this morning," where
he points out that everything is inferential excepting
some data of color. Venn chooses a somewhat more
complex case. Some one proposes to join a walking
party and it is said of him : "I can see plainly enough
that he will not be fit for our excursion." The least
analysis would resolve this into : ' I see the man is ill,
and therefore conclude he cannot take a long walk.'
But do we see that the man is ill? Obviously, we only
see that he is pale, has a lax gait, etc., and hence infer
.
he is ill. And each one of these apparent observations
may be analyzed into an inference. Even our esti-
mate of paleness, a color pure and simple, psychological
analysis shows to be no ultimate datum, but in great
part an inference.
Now if it be admitted that observation involves
inference indefinitely continued, what becomes of the
duality which logic had to assume as its starting-
point? If there is no pure presentation, no fact of
sense-perception not already qualified by logical pro-
cesses, how can it be said that logic has to do with a
comparison of the concept with the datum of presen-
tation ? Logic seems somehow to be concerned with
the observation itself. Instead of having a dual
material supplied to it, it is present wherever there is
any known material. There is but one world, the
world of knowledge, not two, an inner and outer, a
world of observation and a world of conception"; and
this one world is everywhere logical. As the world of
ordinary perception it is logical, but its logical charac-
ter is undeveloped, is latent, and hence is utilized at
random, that is to say, extravagantly and erroneously.
As the world of scientific reflection, it is more com-
pletely logical, because its logical character is brought
to consciousness, is rendered explicit, and is thus used
as a criterion, or a standard, in a word, as the truth
by which the false and the irrelevant maybe excluded.
The result is that logic has no dualistic basis.
Ann Arror, January, i8go.
THOUGHT THICKER THAN BLOOD.
BY PROFESSOR F. MAX MULLER.
I HAVE been asked the question, a very natural
question, and one that has often been discussed since
the discovery of Sanskrit and since the establishment
of a close relationship between Sanskrit, Persian,
Greek, Latin, Russian, German, English, and Welsh
—
Does the close relationship of these languages prove a
real relationship between the people who speak these
languages ?
At first sight, the answer seems very easy. As a
negro may learn English and become, as has been the
case, an English bishop, language by itself could hardly
be said to prove relationship. That being so, 1 have
always, beginning with my very first contribution to
the Science of Language—my letter to Bunsen ' On
the Turanian Languages,' published in 1854—I have
always, I say, warned against mixing up these two
relationships,—the relationship of language and the
relationship of blood. As these warnings, however,
have been of very little avail, I venture to repeat them
once more, and in the very words which I used in the
year 1854 :—
' Much of the confusion of terras and indistinctness of prin-
ciples, both in ethnology and philology, is due to the combined
study of these heterogeneous sciences. Ethnological race and lin-
guistic race are not commensurate, except in ante-historical times,
or perhaps at the very dawn of history. With the migrations of
tribes, their wars, their colonies, their conquests and alliances,
which, if we may judge from their effects, must have been much
more violent in the ethnic than ever in the political periods of
history, it is impossible to imagine that ethnological race and lin-
guistic race should continue to run parallel. The physiologist
should therefore pursue his own science, unconcerned about lan-
guage. Let him see how far the skulls, or the hair, or the color,
or the skin of different tribes admit of classification ; but to the
sound of their words his ear should be as deaf as that of the orni-
thologist must be to the notes of caged birds. If his Caucasian
race includes nations or individuals speaking Aryan (Greek), Tur-
anian (Turkish), and Semitic (Hebrew) languages, it is not his
fault. His system must not be altered in order to suit another
system. There is a better solution both for his difficulties and for
those of the philologist than mutual compromise. The philologist
2044 XHK OPKN COURT.
should collect his evidence, arrange his classes, divide and com-
bine, as if no Blumenbach had ever looked at skulls, as if no
Camper had ever measured facial angles, as if no Owen had ex-
amined the basis of a cranium. His evidence is the evidence of
language, and nothing else ; this he must follow, even though it
it were in the teeth of history, physical or political. Would he
scruple to call the language of England Teutonic, and class it with
the Low-German dialects, because the physiologist could tell him
that the skull, the bodily habitat of such language, is of a Celtic
type, or because the genealogist can prove that the arms of the
family conversing in this idiom are of Norman origin ? With the
philologist English is Teutonic, and nothing but Teutonic. Ethno-
logical suggestions as to an early substratum of Celtic inhabitants
in Britain, or historical information as to a Norman conquest, will
always be thankfully received by the philologist ; but if every
record were burnt, and every skull pulverised, the spoken language
of the present day alone would enable the philologist to say that
English, as well as Dutch and Frisian, belongs to the Low-Ger-
man branch—that this branch, together with the High-German
and Scandinavian, belongs to the Teutonic stock, and that this
stock, together with the Celtic, Slavonic, Hellenic, Italic, Iranic,
and Indie, belongs to the Aryan family
' There ought to be no compromise of any sort between ethno-
logical and philological science. It is only by stating the- glaring
contradictions between the two sciences that truth can be elicited
.... Ever since Blumenbach tried to establish his five races of
men (Caucasian. Mongolian, American, Ethiopian, and Malay),
which Cuvier reduced to three (Caucasian. Ethiopian, and Mon-
golian), while Prichard raised them to seven (Iranian. Turanian.
American. Hottentots. Negroes. Papuas. and Alfourous.), it was
felt that these physiological classifications could not be brought to
harmonize with the evidence of language This point was
never urged with sufficient strength till at last Humboldt, in his
Kosmos (I, 353) stated it as a plain fact, that, even from a physio-
logical point of view, it is impossible to recognize in the groups of
Blumenbach any true typical distinction, any general and con-
sistent natural principle. From a physiological point of view, we
may speak of varieties of man,— no longer of races, if that term
is to mean more than variety. Physiologically the unity of the
human species is a fact established as firmly as the unity of any
other animal species. So much then, but no more, the philologist
should learn from the physiologist. He should know that in the
present state of physiological science it is impossible to admit more
than one beginning of the human race. He should bear in mind
that Man is a species, created once, and divided in none of its
varieties by specific distinctions ; in fact, that the common origin
of the Negro and the Greek admits of as little doubt as that of the
poodle and the greyhound '
I have made this long extract from a book written
by me in 1854, because it will show how strongly I
have always deprecated the mixing up of Ethnology
and Philology, and likewise that I was a Darwinian
long before Darwin. At that time, however, I still
entertained a hope that the physiologist might succeed
in framing a real classification of races, on the evidence
of skulls, or the skin, or the hair, as the philologist has
succeeded in forming a real classification of languages,
on the evidence of grammar. But in this hope we
have been disappointed. Mankind has proved ob-
streperous, it has not allowed itself to be classified.
According to Darwin, all men form but one species,
and to his mind that species overlaps even the limits
usuall}' assigned to mankind. So far there seems to
beat present a general agreement among physiologists.
But all further attempts at classifying the human
species have signally failed. Some biologists (Virey)
have proposed two classes ; Cuvier proposed three,
Linnaeus four, Blumenbach five, Buffon six, Prichard
and Peschel seven, Agassiz eight, Pickering eleven,
Friedrich Miiller twelve, Bory de St. Vincent fifteen,
Morton twenty-two, Crawford sixty, and Burke sixty-
three.* This does not prove that all these classifi-
cations are wrong. One of them may possibl}' here-
after be proved to be right. But at present not only
is there the most decided disagreement among the
most eminent biologists, but some of them, and these
men of high authority in biological science, have
themselves given up the whole problem of classifying
mankind on physiological grounds as utterly hopeless.
Oscar Peschel, in his classical work 'The Races of Man
and their Geographical Distribution,' sums up his con-
clusions in the following words: 'We must needs
confess that neither the shape of the skull nor any
other portion of the skeleton has afforded distinguish-
ing marks of the human races ; that the color of the
skin likewise displays only various gradations of
darkness ; and that the hair alone comes to the aid
of pur systematic attempts, and even this not always,
and never with sufficient decisiveness Who then
can presume to talk of the immutability of racial
types? To base a classification of the human race on
the character of the hair only, as Haeckel has done,
was a hazardous venture, and could but end as all
other artificial systems have ended.'
Nor does Peschel stand alone in this honest confes-
sion that all classification of the human race based on
the color of the skin, the texture of the hair, the
shape of the skull, has completely failed. No one
has of late done more excellent work in ethnology
than the indefatigable Director of the American
Bureau of Ethnology, Major Powell. Yet this is what
he saysf : ' There is a science of anthropology, com-
posed of subsidiary sciences. There is a science of
sociology, which includes all the institutions of man-
kind. There is a science of philology, which includes
the languages of mankirtd. And there is a science of
philosophy, which includes the opinions of mankind.
But there is no science of ethnology, for the attempt
to classify mankind in groups has failed on every
hand.'
The very Nestor among ethnologists, Horatio Hale,
from whose essay on ' Race and Language
'J I have
largely quoted, has, after a long life devoted to eth-
nological and linguistic studies, arrived at exactly the
Horatio Hale. Race attd Language, p. 340.
t Science, June 24, 188;.
t Popular Science Review, January. 1888.
THE OPEN COURT. 2045
same conclusion, and expressed it with the same open-
ness, that the classification of mankind cannot be
founded on color, hair, or skull, but must be founded
on language.
This is, no doubt, a great collapse. We had all
been brought up with a belief in a white, a j'ellow, a
brown, a red, and a black race ; or, if we entered
more deeply into the subject, we seemed perfectly
certain of a Caucasian, Mongolian, American, Ethio-
pian, and Malay race. More recently, the division of
the human race according to the texture of their hair,
as proposed by Haeckel and adopted by Friedrich
Miiller in his learned work on Ethnology, was accepted
by the new school of ethnologists as meeting all objec-
tions that had been made to former classifications.
Still, it is far better to confess that no satisfactory
classification has as' yet been discovered, than to
maintain that hair, color, and shape of skulls have
proved real criteria of racial distinction. It does not
follow by any means that further research may not
bring to light a real divisor of the human race. At
present, however, color of skin is in conflict with
shape of skull, and shape of skull is in conflict with
texture of hair. What we want is a principle of
division that shall do justice to most, if not to all, the
essential qualities of the varieties of man, provided
always that such essential qualities can be discovered.
Till this is done, I agree with Mr. Horatio Hale
that the most satisfactory, nay the only possible di-
vision of the human race, is that which is based on
language. No one doubts that languages can be
classified, and that the true principle of classification
is their grammar. If some languages stand as yet
apart, which hereafter may be proved to be related,
or if other languages have not as yet been analyzed
at all, that does not interfere with the enormous area
of human speech which has been carefully surveyed.
It is, of course, of that area alone that we can make
any assertion, and our assertion is that the people
who speak the same or cognate languages may, nay
must, be treated as "Closely related. In modern times
the frequent intercourse between all the people of the
world, and the facility with which foreign languages
may be acquired, are apt to make us look upon lan-
guage as something, not essential, but purely acciden-
tal. But that was not the case in ancient times ; and
though -the acquisition of a foreign language may be
accidental, language as such is not. It is language
that makes man man. Language is surely more of
the essence of man than his skin, or his color, or his
skull, or his hair. Blood, flesh, and bone are not of
our true essence. They are in a constant flux, and
change with every year, till at last they return to the
dust. Our body is our uniform, very tight some-
times, very painful to put on and to put off, but still
our uniform only. It matters very little whether it is
black or white. Language, on the contrary, is the
very embodiment of our true self. Take away lan-
guage, and we shall indeed be mere animals, and no
more. And, besides that, it is language that binds
individuals together into families, clans, and nations,
and survives them all in its constant growth, thus
enabling us to base our classification on general and
permanent characteristics, and not on peculiarities
which, for all we know, may be the result of climate,
diet, and heredity.
There can be no doubt that in the beginning at all
events, the members of one family spoke one and the
same language. When families grew into clans and
nations, they would continue to speak the same lan-
guage, and if colonies started from their original
home, they could not but carr)' the same language
with them.
But it is objected, that in the spreading of nations
a mixture would necessarily occur between, say, white
and black tribes.
No doubt it would, and it is for this very reason
that physiological classification breaks down, while
linguistic classification, though it becomes more diffi-
cult, does not become impossible. After blood has
once become mixed, no scientific test has yet been
discovered for distinguishing its ingredients. No one
can tell, for instance, whether the offspring of a white
man and a black woman should be classed as Cauca-
sian or as Negro. The color may be quite white or
quite black, or something between the two. The
nose and mouth may be Negro-like, and )'et the
color may be fair, and the shape of the skull and the
texture of the hair may be Caucasian. After one or
two generations certain varieties may either become
permanent, or they ma}-, by the force of atavism, re-
turn to their original type. New mixtures of mixed
or mongrel offspring with other mongrel or with pure
breeds will make confusion even worse confounded,
and after hundreds and thousands of years, the very
possibility of pure breeds may very justly be doubted.
How then should we dare in our days to classify man-
kind according to such variable peculiarities as color,
skull, or hair ?
The case is very different with regard to languages.
No doubt, while this social intercourse between black
and white people takes place, the white might adopt
some words from the black, and the black from the
white people. But these words could nearly always
be distinguished, as we are able to distinguish French,
Latin, and Greek words imbedded in English. And
there would always remain the criterion of grammar,
which enables us to say that English is and remains
a Teutonic language, even though every word in an Eng-
lish sentence should be, as it often is, of Latin origin.
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Lastly, it should never be forgotten, that if we
speak of Aryas, we mean no more than the speakers
of Aryan languages. As to their color, skull, or hair,
we neither assert nor imply anything, unless we hap-
pen to know it from other sources. We may thus
use 'languages' as a synonym of 'people,' just as
Nebuchadnezzar addressed his subjects, ' O people,
nations, and languages.' It is quite possible—in fact,
it is almost inevitable in the constant turmoil of
history—that the same language may come to be
spoken by the white and the black, or any other variety
of man. We take that for granted, and we should
always have to make allowance for it, whenever we
have to make any assertions as to the physical appear-
ance of the Aryan or Semitic or Turanian speakers.
But even then there remains the fact that, whenever
there is a mixture of language, there is at the same
time a much greater mixture of blood ; and while it is
possible to analyze mixed language by scientific tests,
no tests whatever have as yet been discovered for
analyzing mixed blood. It would be very hazardous
to say that hereafter such tests may not be discovered,
and that a classification of the human race according
to physiological peculiarities is altogether impossible.
What I maintain is that all attempts hitherto made
have failed, and that if we want to classify the species
to which ^ye belong, we can only do it on linguistic
grounds.
Much fault has been found with a remark which I
made many years ago, that the same blood runs in the
veins of the Sepoy and of the English soldier, that they
are brothers in blood as well as brothers-in-arms. And
yet, though it is difficult to prove it in every single
case, all speaks in favor of supposing that the soldier
who speaks English and the soldier who speaks Ben-
gali, must be descended from ancestors who in far dis-
tant times spoke the same language and shared the
same blood. There may be Sepoys of Mongolian ori-
gin ; but though of course I did not mean them, yet the
probability is that even they, if they have learned to
speak an Indian vernacular, are descended from
ancestors whointermarried with women of Aryan origin.
As a rule, no tribe, whether conquered or conquering,
adopts the language of the conquerors or the con-
quered, and abstains at the same time from inter-
,
marriage. And what one single marriage may pro-
duce can easily be shown. Let there be one couple
of a black man and a white woman, and suppose
they have two children, a boy and a girl. Let that
boy and that girl marry two outsiders, whatever their
color may be. Then, if each of these couples has
again two children, there would be four mongrels.
In another twenty years these four might produce
eight, and in another twenty "years these eight might
possess a family of sixteen mongrels. If this process
is carried on at the same not ver}' extravagant ratio
of two children to every couple, six hundred years
would suffice to produce a population of 2, 149, rg6,448
human beings. This, I believe, is more than the
population of the whole earth. If we ask what the
language of all these people would be, the answer is
easy. It would be the language of one of their two
ancestors, and it need not differ from that language
more than the English of to-day differs from that of
Robert of Gloucester. But however much it differed,
we could always discover whether the grammar, the
lifeblood of their language, was like that of the
Negroes or like that of the Greeks. With regard to
color, skull, and hair, however, it would be impos-
sible to hazard any conjecture. If the original white
man and black woman were only varieties of a
common type, and their color was due to climatic
influences, their offspring might be neither black nor
white, but any color,
—
grey, brown, or red. The
noses of their descendants might be Greek or Negro-
like, their skulls dolichocephalic or brachycephalic,
their hair straight, or curled, or tufty.
It was necessary to enter into this subject more
fully, because, whether from a dislike of the idea that
the same blood might run in the veins of the Sepoy
and of the English soldier, or from some other cause,
the idea of an Indo-European humanity has often been
scouted, and our ancestors have been sought for in
every part of the world rather than somewhere in Asia.
You will now understand in what sense Indo-European
speech is equivalent with Indo-European race, and
how far we are justified with Nebuchadnezzar to use
languages as synonymous with nations.
It may be that the practical usefulness of the lesson
taught us by the Science of Language, that all Aryas
do not only speak the same tongue, but are children
of the same parents, is at present confined to the dark
inhabitants of India and their fair rulers who came from
the extreme West of Europe. But in time to come the
same lesson may revive older and deeper sympathies
between all Indo-European nations, even between
those who imagine that they are divided, if not by
language, at all events by blood.
The Celts of Ireland are Aryas, and speak to them
only the language of the Aryan brotherhood, and
the wild fancies of a separate Fenian blood will soon
vanish.
The French are Aryas, and more than that, they
are, to a very considerable extent, Franks, and their
veins are as full of the best Teutonic blood as their
language is of the best Teutonic speech. Why should
the French and the Germans not learn again those
neighborly sentiments which have made the west-
ward march of-the Aryan brotherhood the triumphal
progress of true civilization ?
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The Slaves are Aryas, and so far as they are Aryas,
tillers of the soil (for that is the original meaning of
the word), they have preserved some of the noblest
features of the Aryan race. Why should they be
taught to look upon their German neighbors as aliens
and enemies, when they have so man}' interests and
so many duties in common ? Why should there be
strife between their herdmen, when they know that
they are brethren, and there is land enough for all of
them, Qn the right and on the left ?
These may seem but idle dreams, of little interest
to the practical politician. All I can say is, I wish it
were so. But my memory reaches back far enough to
make me see the real and lasting mischief for which,
I fear, the Science of Language has been responsible
for the last fifty years. The ideas of race and nation-
ality, founded on language, have taken such complete
possession of the fancy both of the young and the old,
that all other arguments seem of no avail.
Why was Italy united ? Because the Italian lan-
guage embodied Italian nationality. Why was Ger-
many united ? Because of Arndt's song, What is the
German's Fatherland ? and the answer given. As far as
sounds the German tongue. Why is Russia so power-
ful a centre of attraction for the Slavonic inhabitants
of Turkey and Germany ? Because the Russian lan-
guage, even though it is hardly understood by Servians,
Croatians, and Bulgarians, is known to be most closely
allied. Even from the mere cinders of ancient dialects,
such as Welsh, Gaelic, and Erse, eloquent agitators
.know how to fan a new, sometimes a dangerous,
fire.
The Science of Language has encouraged the various
national aspirations in places even where separation
and national independence would mean political anni-
hilation ; it has called forth a spirit of separatism. Yet
it has also another lesson to teach, that of an older, a
higher, a truer brotherhood—a lesson too often for-
gotten, when the opposite lesson seems better to
answer political ends. As dialects may well exist by
the side of a national speech, nay, as they form a con-
stant supply of life, and vigor, and homely grace to
the classical language, so imperial rule does not ex-
clude provincial independence, but may derive from
the various members of a great empire, if only held
under proper control, its best strength, its permanent
health, and that delightful harmony which is the re-
ward of all true and unselfish statesmanship.
VITALISM AND THE CONSERVATION OF ENERGY.
A great difference appears to exist between an
animal that moves about and a stone that remains on
the spot where it has been placed. It seems as if
every child might easily explain it. And yet it re-
quired the lapse of centuries before scientists could
tell us what were the characteristic features of animal
life.
In former centuries people were satisfied to state
that the animal was alive, while a stone was not alive.
And we may perhaps, even in the present day, accept
this explanation. But we refuse to be paid with empty
words. We now ask : What is life ?
In past ages it was assumed, that certain things
were alive, because they contained vitality or a vital
principle. This simple explanation was called Vitalism.
The vital principle, it was held, manifested itself
through spontaneous motion. Things that contained
no vital principle were not alive ; and could therefore
be moved by push only, by a vis a tergo, as they said ;
that is, through a mechanical pressure from without.
The striking feature of living things, of both plants
as well as animals, is their organic growth of which
inanimate objects are destitute. Thus it became cus-
tomary to distinguish an organic and an inorganic
kingdom ; and when chemistry, the youngest science,
was born, a new flood of light was expected to be shed
upon the obscure problem of vitalit}'.
Chemists, indeed, discovered, that all living sub-
stance of the animal and the vegetable kingdoms con-
sisted chiefly of four elementary substances ; viz., of
oxygen, carbon, hydrogen, and nitrogen. There were
very slight admixtures only of a few other ingredients,
such as phosphorus, sulphur, iron, chloride of sodium
(salt), etc. Life, it appeared, must depend upon the
interaction of oxygen, carbon, hydrogen, and nitrogen.
Accordingly, these four elements were called organic
substances. Thej' were supposed to be the substances
of life.
But the hope that from a difference of matter the
problem of vitality could be solved, was preposterous.
In many respects the so-called organic substances do
not differ at all from the inorganic substances, and there
exist many combinations of the organic substances
that are neither of an animal nor of a vegetable nature
We cannot therefore look upon living things as com
binations of the organic substances ; they are more
than combinations of organic substances ; they are
organic substances in a special form which admit of a
constant interaction. Substances of such a form are
called organized substances—well to be distinguished
from organic substances. The idea of a life-substance
had to be abandoned, and scientists now tried to ex-
plain the problem of vitality from the supposition
of a vital energy. This vital energy was considered
as different from any other kind of energy, and many
very prominent scientists looked upon it as a super-
natural quality which lay beyond explanation.
The theory that a vital energy animates living
bodies was maintained until half a century ago by our
most prominent physiologists. But it received its
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death-blow, when the law of the conservation of en-
ergy was recognized to the full extent of its importance.
We now know that all forces in nature are motions of
some kind : light and electricity are undulations of
ether ; heat is a molecular vibration ; and mechanical
motion, change of place or visible movement, can be
transformed into any other energy, electricity, light,
or heat. Vice versa, motion can be reproduced from
the other energies.
Energy* certainly often seems to disappear and can
apparently be created again. But it can be shown
that energy, when it disappears, reappears in another
form, and that the energy thus created did exist before,
it was only transformed. Energy may be latent ; and
latent energy can be set free again. Because latent
energy ca?i be set free again, it is called potential en-
ergy (L. L. potentialis, from possum, I can).
Suppose my hand exercises a force represented by
A B upon your hand, and your hand resists the pres-
sure by exercising an equal force in the opposite direc-
tion B A, there will be no motion. Let the stress
between the two hands represent the force of A B+B A.
This stress is latent energy; it is potential and can be
converted into an energy of motion, or, as it is termed,
into kinetic energy.
If it takes a pressure of ^ j5 to set the spring of
a toy gun, the spring will exercise the same amount of
force {B A) upon the catch that keeps it compressed.
There will be no motion, so long as the catch is strong
enough to endure the pressure B A. But the force
^ ^ is not annihilated ; it still exists as potential
energy and can be set free at any moment by the re-
moval of the catch, which is done by pulling the trig-
ger. The pressure B A, that the spring exerts, was
created through the expenditure of the force A B dur-
ing the act of setting the gun. The spring is, so to
say, loaded, it is freighted with a certain amount of
energy ; and if the trigger is pulled, a kind of explo-
sion takes place— i. e., kinetic energy is suddenly set
free, which is available for doing work. In a toy gun
it is used for throwing pebbles or peas.
A house of cards in the same way represents poten-
tial energy. One card keeps the other standing by
pressure and counterpressure. If through the inter-
ference of some change the pressure of one card ceases
to be quite equal to that of the other, the house breaks
down, thus changing stress into motion—or, in other
terms, thus changing potential energy into kinetic
energy.
The building up and breaking down of a house of
cards is a process visible in all its details. But there
* Leibnitz called a f -rce thai acts as motion of some form "vis viva." or
"living fjrce." He defined vis viva, as twice tbe mass times the velocity,
2 /W V. But now file term kinetic energy (from Kivav, to move), energy of
motion, has become customary, and we understand by kinetic energy half the
mass times the squaie of velocity ("4 M V '). See Maxwell, T/ieory ofHeat,
page go.
are chemical compositions that are similar to such
houses of cards, yet do not show the details of the
building up and breaking down. It takes a certain
amount of energy to build them, and they thus contain
potential energy. Whenever a very small change, a
slight concussion, an increase of temperature, or a
spark, can cause their breakdown, they are called
"unstable." Gunpowder and all other explosives are
of this character.
Although kinetic energy may disappear when it is
changed into potential energy, yet energy itself can-
not be destroyed. Neither can it be produced. Like
matter, energy is indestructible.
The question now arises : Is vital force different
from both these energies ? And the unequivocal an-
swer is. No ! The energy which living beings expend
in their activity, in their motions, their passions, and
in their thought, is the same energy that we meet with
everywhere, and which is produced in animal bodies
in a more complicated way, yet in a similar manner
as work is done by machines.* As machines are fed
by coal and heated by the combustion of coal, so the
animal receives food, which through the organs of
digestion is assimilated and transformed into highly
complicated,'unstable combinations. Like gunpowder,
or like a drawn spring, these unstable combinations
contain potential energy. An unstable combination
of high complexity, when breaking down into a more
stable combination of less complexity, sets free that
quantity of kinetic energy that was necessary to
build it up and to keep it in a state of tension. In the
animal body, as in the fire-box of a steam-engine, a
process of combustion takes place : the exceedingly
unstable oxygen of the air combines with carbon and
nitrogen compounds, which are also unstable and to
which oxygen bears a great affinity, i. e. , it easily com-
bines with them into more stable compositions. All the
details of this process are not yet fully known and cal-
culated ; but the theory itself can no longer be doubted.
Combustion means oxidation ; and oxidation, con-
verting substances into more stable combinations, sets
energy free, which appears either as heat or as work
performed. The process of oxidation in the fire-box
of a steam-engine is a luminous process, while in the
body it is not strong enough for developing visible
flames. Oxygen, in the process of combustion, unites
with carbon into carbonic acid and leaves behind
water and other incombustible parts.
Oxygen is conveyed into the body by respiration
;
in the lungs the blood is oxidized, which carries the
oxygen to the different organs. Through the oxida-
tion of the tissues in the nerves, in the muscles, and in
other living substances, potential energy is set free
which partly appears as heat, partly as work per-
* See Gavarret, De la chaleur produite par les Hres vivants.
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formed. The heat is called animal heat, the work
performed is the movements of the body. The pro-
ducts of the o.xidations are carbonic acid, water, and
certain nitrogen compounds, which are given off in
the secretion of urine, in the air expelled from the
lungs in breathing, and through perspiration.
Professor Bunge in Basel has again recently adopted
the expression vital energy. Bunge justly maintains,
that the forces that appear in a living animal organ-
ism are entirely different from all other forces in nature.
In this manner he re-admitted the obsolete term
vitalism. In Professor Bunge's writings, however,
the term vitalism is in so far modified and modernized,
that the Professor does not at all contest that this vital
energy is just as much energy as any mechanical
movement, heat or electricity, and that it originates
by way of transformation from other forms of energj'.
Vital energy is nevertheless entirely different from
other forces, even as electricity differs from heat or
from visible motion, from friction, or from light.
In the old electric machine friction is transformed
into electricity, and we know that electricity as wallas
friction is a certain mode of motion : still electricity is
not friction. Thus, vital energy is likewise quite a
special form of energy, which form is different from all
the other forms of energy from which it can be pro-
duced.
Vitality is an energy just as well as all other
energies, but its form is peculiar ; it is neither elec-
tricity, nor light, nor heat alone, nor any other energy
we know of, although it may be more or less similar
to the one and to the other. Vitality originates from
the same great reservoir of energy as all the other
forms of energy, and it stands with them in a constant
interaction. Yet the only engine by which, to our
knowledge, vital energy can be created, is the animal
organism. According to the present state of knowl
edge, we can, to say the least, hardly expect to be able
to produce vital energy in any other manner. This
truth is most concisely formulated in the statement
that life comes from life only.
IS THE UNIVERSE MORAL?
A LETTER FROM MR. FRANCIS ELLINGWOOD ABBOT. WITH A
REPLY BY DR. PAUL CARUS.
Dr. Paul Carus :
—
Dear Sir ;—I am obliged to you for your very kind letter,
inviting me to reply to your criticisms on my recent address in the
columns of The Open Court. Although extremely pressed for
time, I cannot forbear showing my respect for your frankness and
courtesy by at least a few words on one or two main points. In
devoting itself so largely to philosophical subjects. The Open
Court probably sacrifices something of popularity and immediate
influence on affairs ; but I ought not to let slip this opportunity of
expressing my appreciation of its great improvement in the edi-
torial columns, in point of ability and interest for thinkers, since
you have had charge of it.
Under your predecessor, the standing notices announced that
the paper was devoted to "Monism and Agnosticism, as positive
and negative aspects of the one and only rational scientific philos-
ophy." A more inane or self-contradictory position than this it
would be difficult to imagine. Monism is a definite theory of the
universe in its unity and wholeness, as a known noumenal reality;
Agnosticism is the principle that every such theory is groundless,
and that human knowledge is strictly limited to phenomena. To
profess Monism and Agnosticism at the same time, therefore,
betrays hopeless ignorance of the very A B C oi philosophy. No
such ludicrous blunder is chargeable to you. Your bold and ex-
plicit rejection of Agnosticism, as utterly un philosophical in prin-
ciple, has commanded my admiration and hearty sympathy ;
and, while I often differ from you, I am quite as often struck by
your genuine insight and penetration into principles about which
so many flounder in impotent bewilderment.
There is an instance of this among your criticisms of my ad-
dress, many of which however are based on a hasty misreading of
it. I quote your own words here :
—
"The relations among things, the forms of things, are reali-
ties also [as well as matter]. They are not materialities, not
things, but they are real nevertheless They are most important
realities, and all higher life, all intellectual existence, and all
ethical inspiration depend upon them. Z'/w wor/d offorms, indeed,
is identicid with spirituality. [Your own italics. ) .... We do
not accept Kant's position. We say: The thinking subject is a
part of the objective world. The same laws hold good for both.
It is all but impossible that the formal laws of the one should be
different from the f.rmal laws of the other The highest
laws of nature are the laws of form."
All this is most admirably said. Follow out those principles
and you will come to agree with me where you now think you
most dissent.
Is not the Moral Law the highest formal law of the thinking
subject ? Does it not give form, meaning, and worth to the highest
personal activity ? Very well, then ; you yourself see, and say,
that " it is all but impossible that the formal laws of the one [the
thinking subject] should be different from the formal laws of the
other [the objective world] ; and from this it must follow that the
Moral Law is a formal law of Nature, and the highest of all her
known laws. Hence, on patient and cjlm reflection, you will
recall your "most emphatic objection" to my position that morality
is the all-pervading law of the universe ; yoa will withdraw your
declaration that "the universe, or, if you prefer, God, is neither
moral nor immoral." For your own principles, quoted above, are
my best answer to these criticisms *
Another point, connected with the foregoing. You say: "The
Universe is a law unto itself ; and concord with that law is
morality." This is most truly and most beautifully said, provided
the la-w of the Universe is the Mora! Lniu; but it is utterly untrue,
and as utterly unbeautiful, '/ that law is mere blind, uitin/elligent,
unmoral force. If the latter alternative is the truth, morality
consists in defying the law of Force even unto death, and obeying
that Moral Law which man knows and the Universe knows not
—
though how man can know any law which is not a law of the
Universe itself, you altogether omit to explain.
Think more deeply, and more consistently with your own
best insights, and you will begin to see more truth than you imagine
* In fact, you expressly say, in your " Fundamental Problems," p. 152 :
" The idea of a God as the possible presence of a Moral Law in the world to
which we have to conform, is a conception of pure thought, which involves no
self contradiction." I do but show positive grounds for this possible con-
ception.
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now in the positions you controvert. They will bear study—long
and close study ; and the reward will be great.
I have time left for only one correction of your rather nu-
merous misapprehensions of my meaning. You say :
—
"The parson is a perfect organism, and the organism is a
perfect machine. Bat not t'ia- versa: not every machine is a per-
fect organism, nor every organism a perfect person." And you
seem to suppose that I meant to affirm they were. Allow me to
quote what I actually said :
—
"Each and every one of us, is, at once, a Machine, an Or-
ganism, and a Person ; each and every one of us comes under the
law of Causality in Motion, of Finality in Life, and of Morality in
Conduct. The three types and the three principles are united in
one harmonious system and one harmonious action in the Person,
and in the Person alone; they meet, they unite, in nothing else within
the whole scope of human experience. Here, then, in human ex-
perience and positive science, lies the only possible foundation for
a scientific conception of the universe which shall embrace within
itself all the elements of known truth. The Machine involves,
but does not explain, the Organism ; the Organism involves, but
does not explain, the Person ; but the Person both involves and
explains the Organism and the Machine. All types of real being,
therefore, are united and identified in the constitution of the
Person ; all principles of real being are united and identified in
in the principle of Personality."
If you compare your words with mine, you will see that we
said precisely the same thing, and do not differ on this point at all.
It is a pleasure to find a critic who does not, like some others,
feel afraid to "go into a consideration of the arguments." Per-
haps, when you have pondered as long as I have the profound
question, What is the Form of Nature ? you may arrive at the
same answer. Personality. But, even if not, it will not lessen the
respect or the sincerity with which I subscribe myself.
Very Truly Yours,
Cambridge, Mass., Jan. 8, iSgo. Francis E. Abbot.
Mr, Francis Ellingwoop Abbot:—
Dea? Sir:—If you understand by "moral" that which is
good, or that which has, perhaps better that which ought to have,
every one's approbation, I do not hesitate to call the laws of the
Universe moral. But in that case you are obliged to explain what
you understand by " moral or good." People are not at all agreed
upon that which is to be called good ; and certainly sentimental
goodnaturedness is not a quality of the Universe. In that sense
God is not good.
If you understand by "Morality" the conformity of an in-
dividual to the laws of the All, you cannot properly call God
or the Universe moral. God then may be called the standard of
morality
;
its objective ground and the determinative measure to
which all moral rules must be referred in order to be tested.
But we do not haggle about words. I have no objection to
your usage of the word " moral," provided you do not attach an
anthropomorphic conception to the word. And I hope thai these few
sentences suffice to explain my meaning when I say : The All is
non-moral ; it is as it is ; and we are moral in so far as we are in
conformity with its laws.
*
-X- *
Our difference in the usage of the word ' ' moral " does not seem
to imply a difterence of opinion. There is another difference,
however, concerning which I am not so sure. You say ; "The
moral law is the highest formal law of the thinking subject."
Morality, it is true, is, as it were, the logic of conduct. Morality
is based on the laws of formal thought, and ethics, the science of
morals, is a regulative science. All regulative sciences are based
on the laws of form. Arithmetic is the regulative science of cal-
culation ; it contains purely formal statements, and its figures are
empty abstractions. But such purely formal statements, as for
instance, ' five times five is twenty five,' hold good under all cir-
cumstances ; and the empty figures may be applied to apples as
well as to suns or planets, and they will ever prove reliable. Thus
ethics, as Kant has shown in his excellent monograph on the sub-
ject, has its formal aspect ; it must, as a logic of conduct, be based
upon the laws of form Nevertheless, I object to calling ethics a
formal science, for all formal thought, abstractly considered, is
empty. Mere formal ethics, like pure logic or the empty figures
of arithmetic, is an abstract " ought " that is applicable to the code
of a band of pirates just as well as to the laws of a society of hon-
est men.
The logic of conduct has a special content which is derived
from experience A purely formal ethics would remain without
application ; it would be like Aristotle's formal logic, in which
the most foolish and futile propositions can be made ; they remain
correct so long as they do not contain contradictions Yet valuable
though purely formal logic may be to free our minds from errors,
this science will never help us to find out a positive truth. For
that we have to go to the ever-flowing well of facts, we must face
the actualities of real life and gather in the treasures of experience.
Purely formal ethics has no value, unless it derives its content
from, and again applies it to, experience.
Why do we consider it wrong to kill a man, yet eat the meat
of oxen and other animals which we know have been slain for that
purpose ? There is no apriori answer to this question ; it is a matter
that has to be decided, not by formal laws, but by experience ; al-
though, as a matter of course, experience must be guided by the
calculation and foresight which become possible through an appli-
cation of formal laws. The thinking subject therefore cannot
evolve out of itself alone the moral lav by an apriori process of
reasoning The thinking subject must study nature and must then
comply with nature's laws. By nature I do not mean here the
earth, its mountains and vegetation, but all that is, human society
and the laws of human society included.
You are very strong yourself on this point, that God or Nature
can be, and must be, scientifically investigated. Will you limit
the source of information to the formal merely ?
I have devoted to this question more space than its importance
seems to command. It may be that we agree on this point. Yet it
is a question of principle ; it is the principle of method (it is the
method, how to arrive at a statement of that which must be con-
sidered as moral) ; and whether we agree or not, we ought first to
be clear about the principles upon which we stand and from which
we proceed.
^c- *
The main difference between our positions, unquestionably, is
our conception of the idea of God. You call God a person, and I
reject the personality of God. God is that power of the All which
has produced us, which lives in us, and which commands our
obedience. So long as we observe its behests, it will live in us ;
and so long as it lives in us, we shall continue to live. Although
this form of life, the bodies in which we now live, may be broken,
God will rise again and again in other and similar forms, un-
destroyed and indestructible.
God, as I conceive him to be, is not less than a person, but
more than a person. The frailty of personality does not apply to
him ; there is no limitation, no individuality, no distinct idiosyn-
crasy about him. He is not (as according to my conception every
person is) one special form and combination, yet he is the univer-
sality of law, inflexible, immutable, eternal. You can adapt your-
self to him, but you can never adapt him to yourself. The hea-
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thenish custom to attempt an adaptation of God to ourselves, is not
yet extinct in Christianity.
It is for that reason that I prefer the expression " God is non-
moral," because I look upon God as the highest and ultimate and
absolute authority of that which has to be considered as moral.
When you call God moral, you imply that he is in conformity
with the highest law of the Unive-se In that case the moral
law is more divine than God, and God would be divine only in so
far as he is in harmony with it. A God who is moral, whether he
be impersonal or a person, becomes redundant for those who
make the highest law of the Universe their God. Let us obey
that very highest authority, to be in conformity with which even
Gods are endeavoring, and we need not mind the wrath or favor
of any divine personality, for that law is ths supreme God. it is
the only true God.
Certainly the Universe is not mere force, but is force ruled by
law. I find that " Law " and " Force" are often called blind by
naturalists. Natural laws are called blind, I suppose, because they
allow of no exception whatever ; because they do not adapt them-
selves to circumstances, as persons might do. But is not the ex-
pression " the blind laws of nature " nevertheless a contradiction,
or at least an inadequateness of simile ? If natural laws do not
adapt themselves tons, we must in cur turn adapt ourselves to
them Bat is that any reasonable pretence for calling them blind ?
Certainly not ; for they make it possible that we neid not grope
blindly about ; being irrefragable, they throw light upon natural
phenomena and thus become our guides and teach us, how we can
adapt ourselves to nature.
We welcome the idea that God is no person, but a law ; not
a being adaptable to circumstances, but an irrefragable authority,
no deified egotism but the omnipotent power of All-existence !
This idea is the republican conception of theology wh-ch can con-
ceive of order and of law without a Prince, and of religion without
the fetish of anthropomorphism.
We have no objection to representing the moral law of the Uni-
verse to which we have to conform, as a person. We may com-
pare it to a father, and with Christ call it " Our Father," just as
well as we like to speak of Mother Nature But we wish to have it
understood that this expression is a simile only— a simile which, if
carried out, will lead to serious misconceptions
Respectfully Yours,
Paul Carus.
CORRESPONDENCE.
GOETHE AS A CELIBATE AND AS A MORAL GUIDE.
To the Editor of The Open Court ;
—
To CLARIFY matters for Prof. Calvin Thomas, permit me to
say that Goethe in his thirty-ninth year took und>r his protection
Christiane Vulpius, a young girl, in no way his social or intellect-
ual equal ; for over twenty years she remained his mistress, and
when nearly sixty he married her from appreheos ons as to the
position of his eldest son. As a matter of courtesy his "con-
science marriage " might entitle him to be ranked with the
married, but we do not feel that he acqaired any right to such
position until after his conceptions of life and duty had taken a
form which his seven to ten years of actual married life did not
and could not in the nature of things substantially change
In our ar icle "Marriage vs Celibacy" we maimained that
Goethe was not a safe moral guide to the young in matters relating
to the sex-impulse— .ve still hold this view.
Professor Thomas evidently belongs to that class of Goethe's
admirers, who, as Bebel says, " read, without the slightest moral
indignation, how Goethe wasted the warmth of his heart and the
enthusiasm of his great soul on one womin after another." Goethe
neither in his life nor works idealizes love. Meister, Faust, Ed-
ward, Werther were of the earth earthy ; each must have his
" pound of flesh."
Not only what we know but what it is p ssible for us to con-
ceive depends upon what wa have experienced G jethe's expe-
rience unfitted him for dealing with the s2x-passion ; he had never
felt or said to himself : this one and no oilier The instinct of pro-
miscuity was strong in him, and Professor Thomaj unwittingly
bears testimony to this fact when in reference to Meister, and
Elective Affin ties, he says : ' ' No one can read either until he is old
enough to distinguish between depicting immorality and recim-
meuding it."
Nature has a Nemesis for every sin One cannot have lived
an impure or irregular life without showing the effect in his writ-
ings, and will unconsciously instill ideas thit debase As Goethe
says in Meister, "whoever spends his early years in mean and
pitiful society, though at an after period he may have the choice
of better, will yet constantly lojk back with longing towards that
which he enjoyed of old, and which haS left its impression blended
with the memory of all his young and unreturning pleasures."
The question of Professor Thomas, whether I regard wedlock
as consisting not in the mutual fidelity of husband and wife, but in
an ecclesiastical sanction, is certainly a strange one. Does Pro-
fessor Thomas not belie .^e that in civilized society there must, in
the sex-relation as in all other matters involving the integrity or
welfare of the community, be something firmly settled by law,
some controllmg power stronger than the " moral fibre of a man " ?
Does he not recognize with Matthew Arnold, that conscience is the
most changing ^ f rules ; conscience in the strong is presumptuous,
in the timid, weak, and unhappy wavering, in the undecided, an
obedient organ of the sentiments that sway us ; more misleading
than reason and nature ?
On this question Goethe himself says, " It is essential that we
lay down and continually impress on men certain laws, to operate
as a kind of hold in life. Nay, I could almost venture to assert,
that better to be wrong by rule than be wrong with nothing but
fitful caprice of our disposition impelling us hither and thither.
And in my way of viewing men there always seems to be a void in
their nature which cannot be filled up except by something decisive
and distinctly settled."
Goethe is always read with profit by the thoughtful and
mature, for his motto in life was that of his hero Faust
:
' AH of life for all mankind created, shall be within my inmost
being tested."
And as Madame Roland said, ' ' those who have seen much are
always worth hearing, and those who have felt much have always
seen more than others
Goethe had certainly both seen and felt much, and hence those
who know how to follow Shakespeare's advice, " Do not pick bad
from bad, but by bad mend," can re id him with benefit.
New York, January, 1890. Susan Channing.
NOTES.
Dr. Morrison I. Swift will give a course of lectures, in Phila-
delphia, during the month of January, on topics of "Social
Economy."
The Magazine of American History for January, contains a
highly entertaining article by the editress, Mrs. Lamb, upon
"William Cullen Bryant in History." The magazine presents
its usual wealth of historical matter. (New York, 547 Broadway).
The Ohen Court will be sent six weeks, free of charge, upon
application, to persons who, before subscribing, desire to become
thoroughly acquainted with its objects and work. It will also be
sent to persons whose names may be recommended to us for this
purpose. Address the Open Court Pub. Co , Chicago, 111.
THE OPEN COURT.
Fundamental Problems.
The Method of Philosophy as a
Systematic Arrangement of
Knowledge.
By Dr. PAUL CARUS.
Price, One Dollar.
No Agnosticism but Positive Science,
No Mysticism but Clear Thought,
Neither Supernaiuralism nor Materialism,
But a Unitary Conception ofthe World,
No Dogma but Religion,
No Creed but Faith.
PRESS NOTICES.
" Le lecteur ne sera pas dispense de voir les de-
tails et de lire I'oeuvre elle-meme "—Revue Philo-
sophique.
" Mjog lj6slega og greinilega ntud b6k urn heim-
speki " ( ' A philosophical work, written with great
clearness and lucidity.") — Thjdddi/, Reykjavik,
Iceland.
" Ein ernstes, von wissenschaftlichem, weitden-
kendem Geist diktirtes 'Wevk."—Deutsche Zeitung.
" We have studied these essays with much in-
terest, and can recommend them to minds not
easily daunted from the analysis of difficult prob-
and healthy
tone prevails throughout."
—
Inquirer, London.
" Dr. Carus brings a thorough acquaintance with
both science and philosophy, and to the pains tak-
ing German habit of thought, he has been able to
add the power to express himself in a simple and
clear English that might well be a model to many
Americans."— (9//m/('?z-(9m/^(7^, Des Moines, la.
OPEN COURT PUBLISHING CO.,
i6g—175 La Salle Street, CHICAGO, ILL.,
P. O. Drawer F
Scientific Pamphlets.
The Open Court is in receipt of a number of thi
latest re-publications of the
Naturwissenschaftliclie Wochensclirilt,
in pamphlet form, which will be sent postpaid t(
any address for the price marked.
PROF. DR. A. SCHUBERT. Das Rechnen an
den Fingern und Maschinen. 20 Cents.
PROF. DR. KARL KRAEPELIN. Die Bedeu-
tung der naturhistorischen, insonderheit der
Zoologischen Museen. 20 Cents.
PROF. DR. E. LOEW. Anleitung zu bluten-
biologischen Beobachtungen. 20 Cents.
DR. F. M. STAPFF. Das 'glaziale' Dwykakon-
glomerat Siidafrikas. 30 Cents.
DR. ROBERT MITTMANN. Die Bakterien und
die Art ihrer Untersuchung. 30 Cents.
DR H. POTONIE. Die systematische Zugeho-
rigkeit der versteinerten HOlzer (vom Typits
Araucarioxyton) in den palseolithischen For-
25 Cents.
The Journal of Hygeio Therapy.
A Scientific and Practical Monthly, of 24 Pages.
Devoted to the Great Interest of Life and Health.
NO MEDICINE ADVOCATED.
SUBSCRIPTION PRICE, $1.00.
Sample Copy, Free,
T. V. GIFFORD, Ml).,
KOKOMO, Ind. Proprietor.
W. SAYLER, LAWYER, Room 34, u6 La Salle
Street, Chicago. Abstracts Examined. Advice free.
All cases.
"Free Thought,"
.A. IjiToeral ToiirrLal.
Published Weekly at 504 Kearney Street,
San Francisco. Cal.
Editors :
Samuel P. Putnam, President of Califor-
nia State Liberal Union.
Geo. E. Macdonald, Formerly with the
New y'ork Truth Seeker.
Mr. Putnam is lecturing in the Pacific States and
his " News and Notes" of travel are an interesting
feature of the paper.
SUBSCRIPTION RATES:
One subscription one year J2.00
Two subscriptions " " $3.00
Three " " " 84.00
Four " " " $5.00
SAMPLE COPIES FREE.
PUTNAM & MACDONALD,
J04 Kearny St., San Francisco, Cal.
Secular Thought
A Journal of Liberal Thought.
The Official Organ of the Canadian Secular
Union.
$2 a Year. Published Weekly. Single Copy, 5c.
CHARLES WATTS, Editor.
31 Adelaide Street East, Toronto, Ont., Canada.
Read what Colonel IngersoU says:
"I am greatly pleased with ' Secular Thought'—
with its form, arrangement, and contents—above all,
with its spirit. It is splendid. I don't see how it
could be better. I read it with the greatest of
pleasure." Col. Robt. G. Ingersoll.
Read what Helen H. Gardener says:
"Permit me to congratulate you on the fine ap-
pearance and tone of 'Secular Thought.' I hear-
tily congratulate our Canadian friends upon the
fact that they are represented by a paper of which
they can be justly proud, and which they need
never hesitate to hand to their most delicate-
minded friends, however religious they may be."
Helen H. Gardener.
AMERICAN
NOTES AND QDERIES.
A WEEKLY PERIODICAL.
W. H. GARRISON, Editor.
CONTENTS :
Queries on all matt^-rs of general literary and
historical interest—folk-lore, the origin of proverbs,
familiar sayings, popular customs, quotations, etc.,
the authorship of books, pamphlets, poems, e':says,
or stories, the meaning of recondite allusions, etc.
— are invited from all quarters, and will be an-
swered by editors or contributors. Room will be
allowed for the discussion of moot questions, and
the periodical is thus a valuable medium for inter-
communication between literary men and special-
ists. For sale by newsdealers.
THE WESTMINSTER PUBLISHING CO
,
No. 6ig Walnut Sii , PHILADELPHIA, PA.
The Open Court Clubbing Rates.
The fie;ures of the first column (to the left) repre-
sent the yearly prices of the various magazines.
The figures of the second column represent the
combined (net) subscription-price for The Open
Court and the magazine opposite. On orders for
additional magazines a discount of 5 per cent, is
allowed.
Architects and Builders Edition of Scien-
:ific An
Art Amateur
Art Interchange without col'd plaPes
Atlantic Monthly
Century Magazine
Cosmopolitan Magazine—New Subscrib-
ers only
Cottage Hearth The
Current Literature
Dawn The
Forum The (New Subscriptions;
Forum The (Old Subscriptions)
Harper's Magazine
Harper's Weekly. .-
Life-Lore
,
Lippincott's Magazine
i MagaMa
Magazine of American History.,
Microscope The
Nation The
Nature (New York and London)
.
New Review
North American Review
Popular Science Monthly
,
Public Opinion, New Subscribers
Public Opinion, Old Subscribers,
Science
Scientific American
,
Scientific American Supplement.
Scribner's Magazine
St. Nicholas
Twentieth Century
Wide Awake
S2.50 S4.00
